General Haller's army returned to Poland in 1919, and with it came 1 Tank Regiment to Łodz, which was equipped with the most modern tanks in the world -Renault FT. The article presents the results of research, which focus on the use of the first subunit of Polish tanks in combat. An important part of the research was to present the course of the first Polish tank battles near Bobrujsk (28.08.1919), which were successfully supported by infantry units in the fight against the Red Army. The presented results are not limited to the description of combat operations but are the basis for presenting tactical conclusions related to the use of tanks on the battlefield at the time.
Introduction
This essay aims to examine the beginnings of the armoured history of the Polish Armed Forces, as well as some brief characteristics of the first tank to be employed by Polish armoured units -the Renault FT. We will present an outline of the history of the 1 st Polish Tank Regiment, its organisational structure and roots connecting it to the 505 th Tank Regiment of the French army. We will conclude by describing the first Polish tank battle, fighting the Red Army for our Eastern border at Bobrujsk on 28 August 1919, followed by tactical conclusions resulting from an analysis of the Bobrujsk battle. The essay does not intend to cover the entire history of the 1 st Tank Regiment and its combat record, but solely aims at shedding some light on its origins and conclusions resulting from its first actual combat situation, in particular its tactical aspects. However, to analyse these issues, we must start with the origins of not only the French armour, but also of the general application of a new invention on battlefields of the First World War -the tank.
The creation of the tank resulted from the challenge of the Western front where, after almost three and a half months of war, the front lines stabilised, stretching from the North Sea to the Swiss border. On its entire length, both sides started intensive earthworks. Moving towards positional defence warfare practically ended manoeuvring actions and put to rest the dreams of the war ending Christmas 1914.
Major changes in the defence structure and, in particular, a significant increase of its durability and depth led to positional warfare dominating the Western front. The foundation of that defence, apart from artillery barrages and engineering works, was the machine gun fire, accompanied by the second echelons and reserve actions. A need to break through a fixed, heavily fortified front line forced the attacking armies to change their modus operandi.
One of the ways to break through heavily fortified defences is a so-called technical battle, so, in other words, to amass strong forces and military means at one location, or to introduce novel technical solutions and inventions, like poison gases or tanks.
15 September 1916 was a milestone for military art, when the meadows of Flers got scarred by the tracks of British tanks, rolling into the history of warfare 1 . However, due to their rather insignificant technical value, they failed to make an impact on that battle. From 1917 onwards, the advancement in technology allowed the perfected tanks (mainly French and used in great numbers) to play more and more important roles on battlefields. Despite these advancements and perfections, the tanks of the time were unable to operate on their own and until the end of WWI, they were used as only infantry direct support tanks 2 .
Origins of Polish armour
The early beginnings of Polish armour are strongly connected with French tanks, French units and French doctrine on battlefield use of tanks.
A new French tank, Renault FT, was very much different from the first armoured vehicles used by British, French and German forces. It was much more modern and it employed revolutionary technical solutions. The most novel feature was placing its main armament in a rotating turret and dividing the tank into combat, driver and engine compartments. The driver compartment was placed at the front of the tank -that's where the driver sat. The combat compartment with the turret was located in the middle, while the engine compartment was at the back, separated by a special partition from the crew. The combat mass of a Renault FT armed with an 8 mm Hotchkiss machine gun was around 6.5 tonnes, rising to 6.7 tonnes with a 37 mm Puteaux cannon. . During the first period of the regiment's operations, namely from June to October 1919, command and officer positions were manned by the French, while the Polish officers remained unallotted. In August 1919, the regiment underwent its first reorganisation, consisting in battalions changing from a three-company structure to a two-company structure and the creation of a reserve company, the so called Instruction Centre
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. Only in October 1919 did Polish officers start to take over, with some French officers returning to France, and some staying in Poland as advisors and observers.
Before the takeover took place in October 1919, the 2 nd tank company was sent to fight for the Polish eastern border to the Lithuanian-Belarussian Front in August 1919. The above forces were loaded on rail carriages at the Łódź Kaliska railway station in Łódź and transported to Lida on 19 August, where they were put under command of the Lithuanian-Belarussian Front. After unloading, the 2 nd company regained its combat capacity in Lida for a few days, and was sent to the frontlines on 2 August.
Bobrujsk 28 August 1919 -the first battle for Polish tank crews
The 2 nd tank company's combat equipment was loaded on rail carriages 18 in Lida and transported to the Jasień station. It got there on 27 August 1919 around 8.30 pm and after unloading, together with an engineer platoon assigned to it, in secured march formation started moving towards its starting point for the attack on Osów around 9 pm. The 2 nd tank company reached its starting point around 2 am on 28 August and started its attack preparations. The march was not without problems, as a wooden bridge over a stream collapsed under the first tank on the approach to the village. The extraction of the tank and getting the remaining tanks over the stream through a ford slowed down the company march.
The 2 nd tank company was ordered to support the attack of the 4 th Great Poland Rifle Regiment (later 58 th infantry regiment) from 1 st Great Poland Rifle Division (later 14 th Infantry Division) on Bobrujsk to push back the Red Army from that town. Polish forces were confronted by 8 th Rifle Division of the 16 th Army, reinforced by field artillery and an armoured train equipped with one 120 mm and four 75 mm guns, operating along the Bobrujsk-Jasień railroad. The Bolsheviks placed their forces on approaches to Bobrujsk in two main defensive positions: 1 st position on the eastern bank of the Volchanka river, 2 nd position at the line of Kislejewicze village. 8 th Rifle Division units used extensive Russian field fortifications from the times of WWI, creating a significant number of points of resistance. The commander of the 4 th Great Poland Rifle Regiment intended to take Bobrujsk by an attack of 3 columns, reinforced by the 2 nd tank company, 3 artillery batteries and an engineer platoon. The units were positioned as follows: 2 nd battalion in the vicinity of the Jasień railway station and Baranowicze, 1 st battalion around Bohuszówki, and 3 rd battalion, the division reserve, around Tarasowicze. The columns received the following orders:
• I column comprising of 1 st battalion, 2 artillery batteries and an engineer platoon was to attack towards Horbacewicze -Pobokowicze -Bałczyn and take the city and fortress Bobrujsk;
• II columns comprising of 5 th and 7 th rifle companies, 2 nd tank company, 2 nd heavy machine gun company, an artillery battery and an engineer platoon was to attack east towards Semkowo, take the Bobrujsk railway station and then capture the city;
18 Three platoon of 5 tanks each were loaded, plus a reserve platoon with 5 tanks, plus the repair and transportation platoon. In total the 2 nd tank company started the attack with 20 tanks.
• III column comprising of 6 th and 8 th rifle companies, 4 th heavy machine gun company and a mine thrower unit was to attack towards Rybkowszczyzna and then to continue the attack along the railroad to capture Bobrujsk The attack of 3 columns of the 4 th Great Poland Rifle Regiment on Bobrujsk commenced on 28 August at 4.30 am. I column attacked on the right wing of the regiment and, after a series of skirmishes at Horbacewicze, Pobokowicze and Bałczyn, got to Bobrujsk at 11:00 am. There at the crossing of the road and the railroad, it was stopped by fire from the armoured train. The train, however, quickly withdrew behind the Berezyna river, following well-aimed fire from Polish artillery batteries. After taking over the city and the fortress, I column continued with fire pursuit of the enemy withdrawing to the eastern bank of the Berezyna.
II column attacking in the centre failed to meet the enemy at first, with the first resistance only at Baranowicze village. Infantry units of the 8 th Rifle Division were placed on the eastern bank of the Volchanka river, 5m wide at that spot. The defences were reinforced here by field artillery. Steep and muddy banks of the river proved another obstacle here, as well as old WWI fortifications located there. Fording the river was also hindered by the fire of the armoured train from Rybkowszczyzna. The tanks formed a battle line and, attacking under enemy artillery fire, reached the bank. When approaching the steep banks, tanks from 1 st and 2 nd platoon fired on the Bolsheviks' position point blank. At the same time, the 3 rd platoon reconned the banks and having found the ford, crossed the river. Then the platoon attacked the enemy from its side, inciting panic and breaking through defences. Then, Polish infantry attacked, previously pinned to the ground by sustained machine gun and rifle fire from the Red Army troops. The infantry forded the Volchanka river, capturing enemy trenches on its eastern bank. After pushing the enemy back, the engineers repaired a bridge destroyed by the Bolsheviks, allowing tanks from 1 st and 2 nd platoons to cross.
Eight tanks from 2 nd and 3 rd platoons engaged in pursuit of the withdrawing enemy, while 4 tanks stayed at the river to help tow 4 other tanks, immobilised in the muddy river bed when fording the river. The attacking tanks met with resistance at the enemy's second defensive position around Kislejewicze village. The infantry attack on the Red Army positions at Kislejewicze was supported by tanks from the 2 nd platoon. After a brief exchange of fire, the enemy withdrew. Around 10.30 am, using forest as cover, the commander of the 2 nd tank company ordered some rest. A threehour break was used to service the equipment, refuel the tanks and have a meal. During the break, some tanks towed from the Volchanka river reached the company. Then, around 1.30 pm, 14 tanks of the 2 nd tank company with supporting infantry entered Bobrujsk, already captured by 1 st battalion of the 4 th Great Poland Rifle Regiment, where the local populace welcomed the Polish tanks enthusiastically.
The left wing saw the attack of III column -it overcame weak enemy resistance at Rybkowszczyzna and followed the attack along the railroad, continuously engaging the withdrawing armoured train. The column reached Bobrujsk at 1.40 pm.
In the city, around 500 Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner. 2 field guns were captured, along with numerous machine guns 20 . Having taken the city, the 2 nd tank company recreated its combat readiness for the next 3 days, and on 1 September 1919, it departed by rail to Wilno to repair the equipment.
A report submitted by the commander of the 2 nd tank company, Capt. Jean Dufour, is noteworthy, describing the first battle of a Polish tank detail:
" 
Conclusions -tactical aspects
While analysing the battle of the first tank unit of the Polish army at Bobrujsk, we need to stress that it was a novel application of the modern equipment -the Renault FT tank -by the Polish army. These actions laid the foundations for later discussions and analyses on tank usage rules in the 2 nd Republic. At first, we need to look at the tank use regulations of the French army, as the company commander and platoon commanders were French, and the tank crews were mixed, Polish-French. Taking into account the training of the French tank crews and their combat experience, we may safely assume that the company acted pursuant to French army regulations, which say: Tanks Analysing the Bobrujsk battle, we can see that this was precisely the way the 2 nd tank company attacked. We may also note, however, how the attack of infantry in cooperation with tanks was organised by the commander of the Polish unit. The tanks were assigned to II column, equalling a battalion, and supported by an engineer platoon. The Polish 2 nd tank company reached the Jasień railway station at 8.30 pm and after a short break moved to Osów, 8 km away, where it was to assume the initial position for the attack. The march was performed at night (21:00-02:00 23 ) on nonreconnoitred unpaved roads. The incident with the collapsed bridge was the result of the lack of reconnaissance of the march route. The target, namely the Bobrujsk railway station, was 24 km away from the initial area, which from the point of view of the radius of operations of Renault FT tanks was at the limit of their tactical capabilities. The total distance to be covered by tanks was 32 km, while the range of Renault FT without refuelling was 35 km on roads and 20 km off-road 24 . When we add problems with fuel supply (some fuel was transported by commandeered horse-drawn carts), the selection of the section the 2 nd tank company was to attack was also far from perfect. The ground was muddy and marshy. The commander of the 2 nd tank company lacked sufficient information about the attack area. The attack was probably not preceded by reconnaissance, hence problems with fording. This task was performed in a combat situation only thanks to the skills of the tank crews, well-prepared tanks and a good decision of the company commander to take a break after breaching the 2 nd defensive line. As we may assume, the time the crews spent on technical maintenance during the night and during the attack was not lost. Another positive experience was the support of the engineer platoon, already showing its efficiency during the march from the Jasień railway station. The engineers also performed well during the attack, i.e. repairing the Volchanka bridge destroyed by the Red Army and helping to tow out the tanks stuck in the river during fording. The tank crews also performed very well during the attack, skilfully unfolding from a pre-battle formation into a battle line under fire. An individual platoon displayed some initiative, surprising the enemy with a manoeuvre, including at the wings (3 rd 22 H. Guderian, Achtung Panzer!, Warszawa 2012, p. 130 . 23 Roughly speaking, a march column advanced at 1.7 km/h. The regulation speed was 7.8 km/h on roads, 2.5 km/h offroad. 24 W.J. Ławrynowicz, Czołg Renault FT…, op. cit., p. 326. platoon). Tactical actions were at a high level, as evidenced by the cooperation of platoons during fording of the Volchanka. The accusation concerning the attack with open hatches is often raised, citing a lack of training and combat experience. However, this may also be interpreted as an attempt to increase manoeuvrability in unknown, rugged terrain. Visibility for the tank commander and the tank driver was quite limited, and opening hatches and panels facilitated driving the tank. In my opinion, the tank crews, with combat experience from WWI, assessed the Bolshevik fire to be ineffective and therefore decided to open hatches and panels during the attack. Much appreciation is also due to the infantry which was adequately trained, and despite never having cooperated with tanks before, carried out the task admirably. Some drawbacks of the new combat device in combat may have been:
• drawing enemy artillery fire to tanks, • insufficient visibility from the tank, preventing the driver having a full view of the situation and staying in contact with the infantry,
• poor fire efficiency with moving tank. Summing up, during the first attack of the Polish tanks, we can see that the regiment command had some problems with planning and organising the attack on rugged, unfavourable terrain, at the limits of the technical capabilities of Renault FT tanks. The reconnaissance was probably faulty, as no adequate information was provided on the enemy and the terrain. A major defect was probably the lack of arrangements between the 2 nd column commander and his subordinate units (company and battery commanders) to finetune the tasks. The success of the attack may predominantly be attributed to the enemy being surprised by the combat use of tanks. The Red Army defence was well-organised, using terrain features and field fortifications and supported by machine gun and artillery fire as well as a well-armed armoured train. Well-armed and armoured tanks, skilfully commanded by pro-active commanders, taking the initiative and sometimes even bravado, caused the enemy to withdraw in panic. The company commander efficiently commanded his unit (by e.g. using combat signals) and surprised the enemy by a manoeuvre (attack on the wing by 3 rd platoon). He kept in mind the military art rules -the purpose of actions and preserving combat capacity.
The first Polish tank battle and subsequent battles for the borders of the Republic in 1919-1920 contributed to outlining tasks for Polish tanks, which may be found in the Handbook for operational service of staffs, published in Warsaw in 1927. Concerning marches it says:
• Tank marches should be limited to day legs of 15 km, followed by technical maintenance of 2-3 hrs. Travelling a leg of 25 km requires an overhaul lasting half a day.
• Rail transport bears no difficulty, loading and unloading are facilitated by movable ramps the tank units are equipped with. The loading or unloading time for a tank company is around 3 hrs 25 .
Looking at these provisions in the battle of Bobrujsk context, we can see that the pressure from time and distance in tank operations has been observed. Also, tank tasks show the influence of French regulations and combat experience of the 1 st Tank Regiment, i.e.:
• Tanks are solely an infantry auxiliary weapon -they are unable to fight on their own.
• The principal task of tanks is making way for infantry by breaking the enemy resistance in defensive positions.
• Tanks are used solely in attacks, possibly counterattacks.
• In order to support infantry adequately, a minimum of 1 tank platoon per 1 infantry battalion should be assigned 26 . It says the tanks should be sent to fight when:
• infantry reaches the defensive positions of the enemy and is about to commence the assault.
It was also thought that:
• To disperse enemy artillery fire and reduce the time for tanks to remain under fire, the tanks should be introduced in great numbers, on a broad front, from initial positions as close as possible,
• The tanks should be delivered to initial positions in secret, so that their appearance in combat may be surprising for the enemy,
• The cooperation of tank units with attacking infantry must be prepared before the attack to coordinate actions 27 . The handbook also emphasises the role of the commander the tanks were assigned to. A commander being assigned tanks should remember:
• To prepare initial positions for the tanks;
• To discuss very meticulously the cooperation between tanks and infantry on the battlefield (discussing all possible events which may take place during the battle, and discuss the functions of tanks and infantry in each case; the better defended the target, the more meticulous preparations must be made);
• That attacking infantry should assist tanks in crossing major terrain obstacles, be it by auxiliary work, or be it by delivering necessary tools or materials;
• To attack, in particular by fire from infantry auxiliary weapons, these terrain spots which contain or may contain anti-tank weapons of the enemy 28 . The first tank battle of 28 August 1919 in Bobrujsk influenced many later events of the 2 nd Republic battles, as well as regulatory provisions. Even among modern tank crews we can note the reverberations of these times.
